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Summary 
 
Distribution of digital content is a key aspect of electronic commerce. Digital 
content industry is threatened by rampant digital piracy. Institutional collective 
management is slow to adapt to rapid technological change in the digital envi-
ronment. In the case of mobile software applications, smartphone and tablet 
operating systems with centralized application repository augment the ability of 
authors and rights holders to control the commercial exploitation of their 
works. However, digital rights management technologies used to prevent un-
authorized reproduction, distribution and use of protected works can also cre-
ate unwanted market effects limiting authors and users.  
 
Key words: Digital Rights Management, DRM, competition, intellectual prop-
erty, mobile applications, application marketplace 
 
Introduction 
Intellectual property rights, especially exclusive rights concerning economic 
exploitation of his work, stand against the widely accepted rules and regulations 
regarding competition and free market economic behaviour.1 Even after fifty 
years of development of the common European market the tension between 
these two well-established legal disciplines is a much debated issue without de-
finitive conclusions and universally accepted policies [Magnani, Monta-
gnani,84].  
In the decades past, there have been many legal and economic arguments con-
cerning the character and scope of application of competition rules on the sys-
tem of intellectual property in the common European market. In this paper, we 
will consider a current and important phenomenon – the question of the impact 
                                                     
1 See References 2-5. 
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of digital rights management (DRM) technology and its legal position on the 
development of the mobile application market. 
 
What is DRM? 
DRM, or Digital Rights Management stands for technical measures, material 
(hardware) or immaterial (software) products whose purpose is to allow the le-
gitimate user limited access to protected content in digital form. These technical 
measures (or technical protection measures, as defined by the articles 11 and 12 
of the 1996. WIPO Copyright Treaty) are meant to stop an unauthorized user 
from copying and distributing protected content in digital form. 
In theory there are many competing definitions as to what DRM actually con-
sists of. A few follow for the sake of better understanding of this complex issue: 
I) "Digital rights management (DRM) is a type of server software developed to 
enable secure distribution – and perhaps more importantly, to disable illegal 
distribution – of paid content over the Web" [Rump, 3]. 
While DRM technology can certainly be deployed via centralized server-client 
architecture, this is by no means its only modus operandi. DRM can be a 
standalone product or encryption software integrated with the protected content. 
II) "DRM covers the description, identification, trading, protecting, monitoring 
and tracking of all forms of usages over both tangible and intangible assets" 
This definition is perhaps too broad and does not focus on the main issue – that 
these technologies are rights management technologies – technologies dedicated 
to manage the use of protected content on behalf of the author, by the user. 
Furthermore, these technologies are digital in nature, and relate primarily to 
protected digital content [Rump, 4]. 
To conclude, DRM is an encompassing term for several different technologies 
used to enforce pre-defined limitations on how to access and use protected dig-
ital content. The technical protection measures we mentioned earlier are some-
times referred to as DRM technology, however some choose to differentiate 
between the two by defining technical protection measures as the technology 
used to control and restrict access as opposed to DRM as technology that relies 
on technology protection measures to implement these controls and re-
strictions.2  
While this technical distinction may be important in identifying actual protec-
tion technology, speaking from a legal discourse DRM has historically been 
regulated as a technical measures and rights management information by the 
WIPO Internet treaties (articles 11 and 12 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and 
articles 18 and 19 of the WIPO Performances and Phonographs Treaties) and 
the European InfoSoc Directive (article 6 of the Directive 2001/29/EC of the 
                                                     
2 "Digital Rights Management and TPM", Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2006., 
available at: http://www.priv.gc.ca/resource/fs-fi/02_05_d_32_e.asp 
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European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation 
of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society). 
Defined in this manner, technical protection measures would consist of using 
various methods of product activation and access control, such as Internet prod-
uct activation, using a registration key or a hardware device (dongle), as well as 
using various encryption methods to encrypt data on physical data storage de-
vices and mediums as well as using digital watermarks to identify intended re-
cipient or the document source. 
Before we analyze the current framework and assess its impact on the develop-
ment of the mobile application market, a couple of clarifications and assump-
tions need to be made.  
 
DRM, intellectual property and competition 
Current legal doctrine, to the best of our knowledge, broadly accepts the notion 
of influencing the application of intellectual property rights through competition 
principles. Increasingly, intellectual property rights are being curtailed by the 
application of competition principles [Korah, 432]. 
This notion is especially present in the common law legal doctrine, especially in 
the United Kingdom, United States [Korah, 433] and other common law legal 
systems, such as those of the former and current Commonwealth members. 
However, this idea is contested in the European continental legal systems, once 
again illustrating the divide between these two legal disciplines [Korah, 434]. 
DRM technology has, through broad international and national legislative ef-
forts, as mentioned earlier, become a legally recognized and regulated means of 
managing the use and distribution of protected content in the digital domain. 
Deploying mobile applications, in essence computer software developed by 
third parties for mobile phones, tablets and other portable computing devices, 
follows rather different rules then obtaining and licensing software for tradi-
tional desktops and laptops under well-established operating systems such as 
Microsoft Windows, Apple OS X or Linux. Mobile applications and mobile op-
erating systems, most notably Apple iOS, Google Android, Windows Phone and 
quite a few other legacy (Symbian, BlackBerry) and upcoming  operating sys-
tems (Mozilla Firefox OS, Ubuntu Mobile etc.) employ a fundamentally differ-
ent model of application distribution then their desktop counterparts.  
Where desktop users usually choose the method of application distribution, and 
intrinsically the application origin, the mobile users usually have only the op-
tion to download and install applications through the official market (such as 
Windows Market, Google Play or Apple App store).3 These markets employ a 
DRM (Digital Rights Management) solution to regulate the way users can ac-
                                                     
3 Some mobile operating systems, such as Android or legacy Symbian, allow users to install ap-
plications originating from third party marketplaces or other sources.  
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cess, install and use protected software, make in-application payments to access 
additional functions and receive periodical upgrades and offers. 
Using exclusively official market content (the only available option for Win-
dows Mobile or Apple iOS users) usually means a higher level of quality con-
trol and application security, having only one official channel of distribution 
also means conformity with the less beneficial traits of the DRM protected ap-
plication delivery system. Furthermore, the fact that an application has been ap-
proved to enter the market does not mean that it will remain accessible in the 
foreseeable future. Once approved, an application can be removed from market 
at any given time by the market service provider.4 Revocation of already pub-
lished applications and preventing certain applications or even types of applica-
tions to enter market is an issue of concern to parties other than developers and 
market service providers.5  
Finally, the ability of market service providers to revoke a potentially harmful 
application is instrumental in securing distributed applications.6 The growing 
mobile devices market has been experiencing a surge in the development of in-
creasingly sophisticated malware applications on an almost a daily basis.7 
 
The role of the DRM technology in the digital content market 
Fundamentally, DRM technology serves as an access control tool to protected 
content. It manages the right to control access to protected content according to 
the rights of the user. It prevents the unauthorized user from accessing protected 
content and prevents illegal reproduction and distribution of the protected con-
tent. Historically, DRM technology has appeared both as a standalone technical 
protection measure as well as a part of a broader hardware and software plat-
form (such as the Apple iTunes system). 
Concerning the management of protected digital content in contemporary trans-
national information economy, content enterprises usually adopt one of the two 
                                                     
4 Mobile application acceptance process for Apple's  App Store is based on a profile certificate 
check approach, which is a standard practice that ensures the integrity of software applications. 
Reasons for revoking an application from the market can vary from violation of a license agree-
ment to different security concerns due to lost encryption keys. Ability of market owners to re-
voke application is very important to ensure security of distributed applications. 
5 Removing a successful application from the App Store has attracted the attention of French gov-
ernment on at least one occasion. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/11/apple-france-
appstore-idUSL5N0CY42J20130411 
6  Even the purportedly secure iOS ecosystem has been found to harbour at least one malware ap-
plication that slipped past the curators. http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/07/first-ios-
malware-found/ 
7 There are numerous reports regarding the mobile malware development in the security industry. 
One of the recent research papers analyzes the case of iOS malware corrupting an already in-
spected application via remote modification of code.  See reference 12. 
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strategies. The content company either develops its own digital distribution 
channel where it licenses access to its content (like Amazon or Sony), or it 
adopts an existing distribution channel developed by another company out of 
specific content business (i.e. the case of music and film studios cooperating 
with Apple or Google). 
It is important to note, however, although it does not in itself present the main 
topic of this paper, that DRM technology in and of itself presents a specific and 
important market. Not only do access control systems limit users in accessing 
and using the protected content in terms of interoperability, preventing the use 
of content licensed by one company through hardware and software of another, 
the technology itself presents a product [Magnani, Montagnani,84] and a market 
where rights holders have an intrinsic motive to adopt the most effective, af-
fordable and secure technological protection measures. Preventing a competitor 
in obtaining the most effective DRM technology can also present a present a vi-
olation of free competition. 
Since DRM is legally protected, and it's circumvention is prohibited by a widely 
accepted legal framework, it is an excellent example to study the effects of 
DRM technology on application market, and indirectly to assess the impact of 
legal protection of DRM on competition in this specific market. 
 
Fairplay/iTunes as an example of DRM protected distribution 
system 
As a content distribution system, iTunes allows users licensing and access to 
music (albums and individual songs), films, television series episodes, radio 
broadcasts, podcasts etc. Since digital distribution eliminates the need for mate-
rial data storage disks, effectively provides free shipping and abolishes other 
costs associated with material products, the licensing fees for digital content are 
usually lower. Individual songs or broadcasts can often be licensed for less than 
one dollar or euro, and allow users to license only content they're interested in 
(not the whole album, season of television series etc.).  
This licensing flexibility, combined with lower cost, has arguably been the main 
reason behind the massive success of iTunes allowing it to become the most 
popular digital distribution system in history.8 
Massive success of iTunes has also attracted the attention of national competi-
tion authorities.9 Some have concluded that Apple's use of DRM in creating a 
                                                     
8 Since April 2004., iTunes has grown from initial 200,000 digital content files to over 20 million 
individual digital content files including music, podcasts, films, music videos, audio books and 
over half a million computer programs for Apple OS X and iOS computer and mobile device op-
erating systems. In the same time period the number of individually registered users has reached 
almost 600 million users, almost 25% of all Internet users in 2013., according to Internet-
worldstats.com and CNN, available at: http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/06/15/apple-algebra-
itunes-asymco/ 
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successful online distribution scheme did not represent a market violation, oth-
ers disagree. While we do not agree with the opinion of the French competition 
authority, its analysis of the Apple's practices yields interesting conclusions im-
portant for the development of the mobile application market. 
As we have mentioned earlier, digital distribution of content eliminates the need 
for material data carriers, packaging and physical distribution reducing the costs 
of distribution to a modest fraction of the original cost. Rights holders have ea-
gerly accepted iTunes as a new distribution channel, especially in the face of 
rampant digital piracy and declining sales of CDs, DVDs and other material 
media. While Apple has since all but abandoned its proprietary "Fair Play" 
DRM system, its introduction in 2003 has secured early support of the many of 
the world's largest rights holder companies and media corporations.  
The terms and conditions in the iTunes user's licence agreement have set the 
standards for the most DRM protected services. Among the most dangerous, 
from the aspect of consumer protection, is the provision allowing the service 
provider to limit or deny access to licenced content in the event of closing the 
iTunes service [Roth, 524]. Furthermore, the user is limited in copying licensed 
content and authorizing additional devices to access licensed content [Roth, 
524]. These terms are still valid for the remainder of the iTunes catalogue, and 
may relate to licensing of mobile applications from the App Store as well. 
How does Apple's behaviour, and indeed the whole iTunes/AppStore/iOS eco-
system affect competition? In order to answer that question the first condition is 
the need to recognize the relevant market.  
Since iOS is Apple's proprietary operating system exclusive to Apple's devices, 
it is obvious that accepting the use of iOS basically means using Apple's devices 
as well. If that is the case, why should using the AppStore as an exclusive 
source for purchase of additional software present a market violation? Is not 
Apple well within its right, as a competitor in an immensely competitive market 
(mobile reproduction devices, smartphones and tablets), to choose a business 
model that binds the hardware (devices) and software (iTunes, iOS, App Store) 
into a whole eco-system as a best chance of market success? The users can 
choose from a variety of competitors offering similar devices and services, and, 
as the French authority asserted in Virgin Mega case, Apple's market share con-
cerning multimedia playback devices (iPod) cannot even be considered a domi-
nant position? 
The answer is the market creating effect of DRM. Not only does DRM prevent 
unauthorized access, reproduction and distribution, it also has a market creating 
effect by preventing users from accessing and using licensed content in a man-
ner of their own choosing. Never before has licensing of content, music, movies 
                                                                                                                                  
9 The above mentioned Virgin Mega v. Apple case and the opinion of the Norvegian consumer 
rights ombudsman available at: http://forbrukerportalen.no/filearchive/Complaint%20against%20 
iTunes%20Music%20Store.pdf 
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or computer software implied a limitation on the actual type of device being 
used to access content. By limiting the users to their own hardware ecosystem, 
Apple has, effectively, created a new market. This is obvious in the case of mo-
bile applications where choosing Apple devices and their iOS system means ac-
cepting AppStore as the only legitimate source of new applications. It is less 
obvious in the case of licensing music or video content, nevertheless Apple's 
implementation of DRM and its restrictions preventing users from using li-
censed content on other devices meant a fragmentation of the existing market 
and the creation of a new niche market – the market of content for Apple de-
vices.  
This development in practice meant that unlike most of the competition in the 
traditional digital content market Apple managed to control the devices and 
download services monopolizing the market of Apple devices in terms of con-
tent distribution. Effectively, Apple has succeeded in using intellectual property 
protection (copyright on software, as well as patents on hardware and software) 
as a means to monopolize access to its devices. While it is understandable that 
competition regulators cannot foresee the future market development, the dis-
parity between the decisions of the European regulators in the cases of Mi-
crosoft and Apple illustrates how information technologies can have unexpected 
economic legal consequences. In hindsight, Microsoft's quasi-monopoly in the 
desktop and server operating system market has shown to be much less danger-
ous and competition, coming both from Apple and Google as well as from the 
Free Software/Open Source community has successfully developed competing 
products and business models. On the other hand, the company whose devices 
were just one of the many present in the mobile media player market which in 
itself at the time of the consideration was a minor market in the broader media 
appliance market turned out to represent a much more serious challenge to 
maintaining competition in several emerging markets (mobile phones and appli-
cations, digital publishing and media).10 
To conclude, it can be argued that Apple's behaviour and usage of DRM tech-
nology resembles the effects of a tie-in agreement – from the competition per-
spective, a well-understood practice of selling a product or a service as a man-
datory addition to a purchase of another product or service.  
The competition practice in the EU (Microsoft Corp v. Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities, 2004) as well as the United States (Jefferson Parish Hos-
pital vs. Hyde, 466 US S2 (1984) has identified five conditions needed to judge 
a tie-in agreement a market violation. The five-step tie-in test [Schmidt, Hed-
wig, 183] may or may not still be viable in general terms and may be substituted 
in the future [Schmidt, Hedwig, 183], but until such time the current criteria 
consists of: existence of two, from the consumer's perspective unrelated prod-
                                                     
10 In 2012. Apple became the company with the highest market capitalisation in the US, worth 
over 600 billion USD. 
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ucts, the dominant position of the market player forcing the tied purchase, pre-
venting consumers from purchasing products separately, endangering the com-
petition and absence of legitimate, objective reasons for a tie-in agreement.  
From user perspective, Apple's ecosystem and the restrictions regarding the 
types and functionalities of applications allowed on its smartphones has from 
the start been received with attempts to circumvent or disable technical protec-
tion. This procedure, colloquially known as "jail-breaking" has been itself an 
object of official inquiry and judicial procedure, at least in the United States.11 
 
The mobile bazaar 
In the seminal 1996 essay "The Cathedral and the Bazaar", a decade before the 
appearance of earliest modern online mobile application stores, the veteran open 
source evangelist E. S. Raymond described the rise of two distinct models of 
application distribution, one governed by a single hierarchical entity (the cathe-
dral) and one open to parallel input from different, competing or cooperating 
sources (the bazaar) [Raymond, 3].  
Where Apple's model is obviously one of a cathedral, where the market service 
provider ultimately decides to accept or reject publishing software and where 
users have no legal recourse to challenge the market service provider's deci-
sions, Google's Google Play model is, in line with open source heritage the 
company draws from, a practical exercise of the bazaar model. 
Allowing users to choose between a curated Google Play market yet retaining 
the option to allow installation of applications originating from other, independ-
ent markets or directly from the World Wide Web or a data storage device, 
Google has adopted a model that fosters competition and openness. Even if an 
application does not qualify for distribution through Google Play market (be it 
for quality control reasons, security etc.) the user still has an option to install it 
through another independent market, directly from the manufacturer's website 
or by locating and installing it manually. 
The phenomenal success of the Android mobile operating system, which ac-
counts for more than three quarters of all smart mobile phones and more than a 
half of all tablet computers owes in no small part to the bazaar model adopted 
                                                     
11 In 2010., the US Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, No.08-10521 MGE UPS Systems INC v. 
GE Consumer and Industrial Inc etc. decided that "The owner’s technological measure must pro-
tect the copyrighted material against an infringement of a right that the Copyright Act protects, 
not from mere use or viewing", effectively establishing jail-breaking, at least in the case of the 
iPhone, a fair use.  In addition, in a previous statement by the federal Copyright Office with re-
gard to Apple's claim of copyright protection over the encryption software in the iPhone's boot-
loader the Copyright Office concluded: "While a copyright owner might try to restrict the pro-
grams that can be run on a particular operating system, copyright law is not the vehicle for impo-
sition of such restrictions." In other words, copyright and even legal protection of technical pro-
tection measures cannot be used to limit the users with regard to the way they use their devices. 
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by Google, and by example followed by the major manufacturers of Android 
mobile phones.12 
 
Conclusion 
Considering the success of mobile application eco-systems developed around 
the App Store/Marketplace model and the central role of DRM technology in all 
but one of the competing systems it is safe to conclude that DRM technology 
can exhibit a strong anti-competition effect.  
It is obvious that open systems allow more user freedom and foster competition. 
While absence of a closed curating system may present security risks and over-
all lower levels of quality control, market forces ensure that users can choose 
quality and advanced technical capabilities unavailable in the closed markets 
due to technical limitations imposed by the proprietary systems or prohibitive 
policies of the market service provider enforced by its DRM. 
However, this is not the case against adopting and further refining DRM tech-
nology. The technology itself is neutral and can be put to constructive use as 
well. Effective DRM technology can enable individual authors – artists, jour-
nalists, programmers – to develop and monetize their work online without the 
need for intermediaries like publishing houses or collective rights management 
societies. Even the closed off application markets of today with their anti-mar-
ket DRM implementation are often a more affordable and effective choice for 
today's authors. DRM and developing content management systems hold the 
promise to finally turn the tide of rights management from collective to individ-
ual – for the first time since the invention of the printing press. 
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